Perpetuating Inequality by Taxing Wealth by Maynard, Goldburn P., Jr.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 84 Issue 6 Article 2 
2016 
Perpetuating Inequality by Taxing Wealth 
Goldburn P. Maynard Jr. 
Brandeis School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Goldburn P. Maynard Jr., Perpetuating Inequality by Taxing Wealth, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 2429 (2016). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol84/iss6/2 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship 
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 2429 
PERPETUATING INEQUALITY 
BY TAXING WEALTH 
Goldburn P. Maynard Jr.* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the decade since Michael Graetz and Ian Shapiro wrote the definitive 
account of the death tax repeal saga of the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
Death by a Thousand Cuts:  The Fight Over Taxing Inherited Wealth,1 the 
federal estate tax has proven to be surprisingly resilient.  After a one-year 
hiatus and a two-year temporary reprieve, the levy was made permanent 
again in 2013.2  At a time when wealth inequality is a topic of major 
concern, the federal estate tax remains the only levy that is meant 
specifically to combat the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few.  
It is also the most progressive part of the tax system, as its burden is borne 
by the wealthiest Americans. 
The survival of the estate tax seemingly fits into America’s newfound 
interest in fighting wealth inequality.  Just last year, Thomas Piketty’s book, 
Capital in the Twenty-First Century,3 became a best seller and prompted 
robust discussions about wealth disparities.  Against this backdrop, it 
appears that Graetz and Shapiro’s warning about “[t]he broader antitax 
force . . . marching forward in Washington and in the great heartland”4 
proved incorrect largely because of the Great Recession. 
That is until we take a closer look.  The current version of the estate tax 
is a shadow of its former self.  According to the Department of Treasury, in 
2014, the estate tax raised $19.3 billion, or 0.6 percent of total federal 
revenue over $3 trillion.5  That figure historically stood at between 1 and 2 
 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville.  I would 
like to thank Tim Kuhner and the participants of the Fordham Law Review symposium 
entitled You Are What You Tax for their comments, questions, and suggestions.  I would also 
like to thank Helen Cooper and James Russell for their invaluable research assistance.  For 
an overview of the symposium, see Mary Louise Fellows, Grace Heinecke & Linda Sugin, 
Foreword:  We Are What We Tax, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2413 (2016). 
 
 1. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS:  THE FIGHT OVER 
TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005). 
 2. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 302, 124 Stat. 3296, 3302. 
 3. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., 2014). 
 4. GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 11. 
 5. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, RECEIPTS BY SOURCE, http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Documents/2014%20Receipts%20by%20Source.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5L53-LJZW]. 
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percent of federal revenue.6  Due to increasing exemptions, in 2013, slightly 
less than 0.2 percent of all estates owed any estate tax at all.7  Further, 
although the marginal tax rate is 40 percent, the average effective tax rate is 
less than 20 percent.8 
There is no shortage of proposals to “fix” the estate tax by making it both 
more far-reaching and meaningful.9  While these proposals are reasonable, 
and even modest, they have failed to confront an important part of Graetz 
and Shapiro’s book:  stories trump science.10  Fittingly, in their defense of 
the Death Tax Repeal Act of 2015,11 two influential members of the 
Republican conference focused on a successful storyline drafted and revised 
in the battles over repeal:  the estate tax as an impediment to the American 
dream framed in terms of the family and the hope of future generations.12 
This Article attempts to correct this shortcoming in the progressive 
argument by returning narrative to its central place in the estate tax debate.  
Drawing on psychological insights, I hope to underscore the difficulty of 
the effort to preserve progressive taxation and combat wealth inequality. 
To this end, this Article proceeds as follows:  Part I provides a brief 
historical overview of the estate tax, including the death tax repeal 
movement, which gained strength in the 1990s.  Common estate tax 
planning techniques also are discussed to show that there is substantial 
room for planning and avoidance of the tax. 
Part II describes how the current estate tax impasse between repeal 
advocates and proponents actually results in a weaker estate tax.  By 
focusing on Graegin13 loans and defined value clauses, I show that 
congressional inaction results in ever-widening loopholes.  Because the 
 
 6. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., HISTORY, PRESENT LAW, 
AND ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM 28 (Comm. Print 2015).  
Also worth noting, 
The percentage of decedents liable for the estate tax grew throughout the postwar 
era reaching a peak in the mid-1970s.  The substantial revision to the estate tax in 
the mid-1970s and subsequent further modifications in 1981 reduced the 
percentage of decedents liable for the estate tax to less than 1 percent in the late 
1980s.  The percentage of decedents liable for the estate tax increased from year to 
year from 1988 through 2000.  The increases in the unified credit enacted in 2001 
and 2010 (and made permanent in 2013) reduced substantially the percentage of 
decedents’ estates liable for the estate tax. 
Id. at 24. 
 7. Id. at 25. 
 8. TAX POLICY CTR., TABLE T13-0020:  CURRENT LAW DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS ESTATE 
AND NET ESTATE TAX BY SIZE OF GROSS ESTATE, 2013, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ 
numbers/Content/PDF/T13-0020.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MFR-4TZY]. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 221–38. But see Paul L. Caron & James R. 
Repetti, The Estate Tax Non-Gap:  Why Repeal a “Voluntary” Tax?, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 153 (2009) (undermining the characterization of the estate tax as voluntary). 
 11. Death Tax Repeal Act of 2015, H.R. 1105, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 12. John Thune & Bill Flores, Time for the Estate Tax to Die, USA TODAY (Apr. 16, 
2015, 6:56 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/04/16/death-tax-abolish-
thune-column/25816117/ [https://perma.cc/VB8Q-RP86]. 
 13. Graegin v. Comm’r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 387 (1988).  See infra Part II for a detailed 
discussion of Graegin v. Commissioner. 
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debates have focused on the right of the family to retain its wealth, judges 
increasingly have tolerated efforts to lower estate taxes, even when such 
planning interferes with the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS or “the 
Service”) collection efforts. 
Part III surveys proposals to make the federal estate tax more robust.  
The proposals present creative solutions to plugging loopholes and fixing 
the estate tax.  However, I argue that the proposals have not confronted the 
underlying narratives that estate tax abolitionists have advanced.  I use 
System Justification Theory to explain the entrenched and persistent nature 
of these narratives.  Finally, I conclude by suggesting some ways forward. 
I.  A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAX 
AND COMMON PLANNING TECHNIQUES 
What usually is referred to as the federal estate tax is technically three 
levies working in conjunction:  the estate tax,14 the gift tax,15 and the tax on 
generation-skipping transfers16 (GST).  In order to understand how the 
estate tax became a part of the conflict over progressive taxation in the 
United States, some historical perspective is necessary. 
A.  History 
The federal taxation system in the nineteenth century mainly consisted of 
indirect taxes, such as import duties and regressive excise taxes on alcohol 
and tobacco.17  As the nation began to establish itself as a world power, 
these taxes provided inadequate funds to meet the increasing revenue needs 
of the federal government.18  This regressive taxation, which burdened the 
working classes disproportionately, along with the rise of the holding 
company and the “unprecedented number of mergers in the manufacturing 
sector,” resulted in wealth becoming increasingly concentrated in the hands 
of the few.19 
Progressives continued to press for both a progressive income tax and a 
tax on inheritances to decrease wealth concentration.20  This eventually led 
to the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment and the enactment of the 
 
 14. I.R.C. §§ 2001–2209 (2012). 
 15. Id. §§ 2501–2524. 
 16. Id. §§ 2601–2663.  Special valuation rules relating to these taxes are included in 
sections 2701 to 2704.  Section 2801 contains rules regarding gifts from expatriates. Id. § 
2801. 
 17. Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State:  Progressive-Era 
Economists and the Intellectual Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV. 
1793, 1803 (2005). 
 18. Id. at 1809. 
 19. Darien B. Jacobson et al., The Estate Tax:  Ninety Years and Counting, in INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., SOI BULL. 118, 120 (2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ninetyestate. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/74V4-PERX]. 
 20. Mehrotra, supra note 17, at 1798 (contending that a particular group of academics 
helped to bring about a radical transformation in the U.S. public finance system).  For a 
comprehensive account of the forces that brought about the progressive income tax, see 
generally id. 
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modern estate tax.21  The estate tax was passed as a part of a comprehensive 
tax reform package in 1916.22  The First World War led to a sharp reduction 
of tariff revenue at a time when the government needed funds for its 
military buildup.23  The tax package transformed the income tax “into the 
foremost instrument of federal taxation,” imposed a significant tax on 
corporate profits, and included an excess-profits tax.24 
The estate tax was not yet on firm footing, however.  In the 1920s, the 
Calvin Coolidge Administration attempted to repeal the levy.25  Between 
1925 and 1928, led by Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, the 
Administration argued that inheritance taxation undermined the nation’s 
economy and was the providence of the states and not the federal 
government.26  In the end, this effort was unsuccessful, as it was opposed 
by respected tax experts who argued that the estate tax helped lower taxes 
for those who actually earned wealth.27 
Although the estate tax was a revenue raiser, this was not the only reason 
for its enactment; the federal government also wished to redistribute the tax 
burden and reduce the concentrations of wealth.28  Because the levy could 
be avoided by giving away property during life, a gift tax eventually was 
added, becoming a permanent fixture of the wealth transfer system in 
1932.29  These progressive impulses influenced tax policy through the end 
of World War II.30  President Franklin Roosevelt viewed wealth 
accumulation as a distinctly social phenomenon.31  For Roosevelt, the 
wealthy owed a debt to the communities from which they drew their 
fortunes, and the control of an ever-widening spectrum of industry by a 
limited number of wealthy individuals stood in contrast to fundamental 
American values of competition and civil society.32 
After World War II, progressive ideals held less sway in tax policy, and 
the estate tax remained essentially the same until 1976.  That year, 
Congress unified the estate and gift taxes into a single rate to combat 
 
 21. Id. at 1856. 
 22. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 200–212, 39 Stat. 756, 777–80. 
 23. W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA 57–60 (2d ed. 2004). 
 24. Id. at 62. 
 25. For a more comprehensive discussion of this repeal effort, see M. Susan Murnane, 
Andrew Mellon’s Unsuccessful Attempt to Repeal Estate Taxes, TAXANALYSTS (Aug. 22, 
2005), http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/672746F8E859EA778525709000 
06AC21?OpenDocument [https://perma.cc/244Q-NX94]. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. David Joulfaian, The Federal Estate Tax:  History, Law, and Economics 1-1 to 1-2 
(June 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1579829 [https://perma.cc/TN4Y-M738]. 
 29. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 501, 47 Stat. 169, 245.  The gift tax was first 
introduced in 1924, but repealed in 1926. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 319–324, 43 
Stat. 253, 313–16; Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1200, 44 Stat. 9, 125 (repealing the gift 
tax). 
 30. BROWNLEE, supra note 23, at 5–6. 
 31. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on Tax Revision (June 19, 
1935), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15088 [https://perma.cc/GL5Q-L8J4]. 
 32. Id. 
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individuals giving away their wealth during their lifetime to take advantage 
of the lower gift tax rate, therefore avoiding the higher estate tax rate.33  
The generation-skipping tax was also added in 1976 in response to tax 
planning that allowed a decedent’s children to avoid paying taxes on their 
death.34  In 1981, Congress lowered the estate tax rate, made the marital 
deduction more taxpayer friendly, and raised the exemption from $175,000 
to $600,000.35 
The 1990s saw the rise of the estate tax abolitionists, who presented a 
sustained challenge to the policy of reducing wealth concentration.  This 
was a broad coalition of outsiders, activists, and legislators who gained 
strength after the Republican takeover of the House in 1994.  The 
abolitionists almost achieved their goals at the end of the century.  In 1999 
and 2000, Congress passed bills to permanently repeal the estate tax, but 
President Bill Clinton vetoed them both.36  In 2001, after efforts for 
permanent repeal failed, President George W. Bush signed into law 
sweeping changes to the estate tax.37  These changes further undermined 
attempts to level wealth concentration.  The estate tax rate was lowered to 
45 percent, and the exemption increased incrementally between 2001 and 
2009 to $3.5 million.38  The estate tax was then repealed in 2010, but was 
scheduled to return in 2011 with a $1 million exemption.39 
At the end of 2010, President Barack Obama reached a compromise with 
Congress that further decreased the reach of the estate tax.40  The law, 
which expired after two years, lowered the estate tax rate to 35 percent and 
increased the exemption to $5 million.41  The temporary law necessitated 
negotiations at the end of 2012.  The President proposed a return to the $3.5 
million exemption and the 45 percent rate.42  Finally, at the beginning of 
2013, the estate tax again was made permanent, with the tax rate increased 
to 40 percent and the $5 million exemption (indexed for inflation) 
retained.43  This compromise ultimately left each side dissatisfied, as 
abolitionists prefer a complete repeal, and progressives prefer lower 
exemptions and a higher tax rate. 
 
 33. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 Stat. 1520. 
 34. Id. § 2006. 
 35.  Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §§ 401–403, 95 Stat. 172, 
299. 
 36. See Lizette Alvarez, President Vetoes Effort to Repeal Taxes on Estates, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 1, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/01/us/president-vetoes-effort-to-repeal-
taxes-on-estates.html [https://perma.cc/DF3P-F7HZ]. 
 37. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16, §§ 501–581, 115 Stat. 38, 69–94. 
 38. Id. §§ 511, 521. 
 39. Id. §§ 521(b), 901. 
 40.  See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 302, 124 Stat. 3296, 3302. 
 41.  Id. 
 42. See Siobhan Hughes, Plan to Raise Estate Tax Divides Democrats, WALL STREET J. 
(Nov. 30, 2012, 7:28 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324020804578 
151430887301890 [https://perma.cc/BS5N-85UK]. 
 43.  American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101, 126 Stat. 2313, 
2318 (2013). 
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B.  Common Estate Tax Planning Techniques 
Ever since the inception of wealth transfer taxation, taxpayers and their 
planners have found ways to minimize tax liability.  Taxpayers have the 
right to avoid, reduce, or minimize their taxes.44  To help explain why the 
estate tax is so porous, I will describe two common estate tax planning 
techniques.45 
The Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust uses a combination of gift and 
estate tax rules to avoid estate taxes and provide liquidity to the grantor’s 
estate.46  Although the details can vary on the margins, the planning 
technique is achieved as follows.  The trust is funded with a life insurance 
policy on the life of the grantor.  The beneficiaries are family members of 
the grantor.  The trust is irrevocable, so it is considered a completed gift.  
The insurance policy is now controlled by a trustee, and the grantor has no 
control over it, so it is out of his estate.47  Because the insurance policy has 
not been paid up, the gift of the policy is not substantial enough to trigger 
tax implications. 
To pay up the policy, the grantor transfers an amount equal to the annual 
exclusion (currently $14,000) each year.48  These amounts are not eligible 
for the exclusion unless they are present interests, which the beneficiary 
could enjoy right away.49  To meet this requirement, the donor gives each 
beneficiary a discretionary right to withdraw the amount for a few days.50  
The yearly transfers continue for the life of the donor and can result in life 
insurance policies valued at several million dollars.  When the donor dies, 
the value of the policy is not included in his estate because he did not 
possess “any of the incidents of ownership.”51 
 
 44. See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 
(1935) (“Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is 
not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a 
patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”). 
 45. More sophisticated planning techniques can yield more significant tax savings.  For 
example, Mitt Romney’s estate planning became an issue after his tax returns showed that he 
had gifted his heirs $100 million tax free.  He used an Intentionally Defective Grantor Trust 
(IDGT). Jesse Drucker, Romney ‘I Dig It’ Trust Gives Heirs Triple Benefit, BLOOMBERG 
(Sept. 27, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-09-27/romney-i-
dig-it-trust-gives-heirs-triple-benefit [https://perma.cc/R2AX-H4VW]; see also Dwight 
Drake, Transitioning the Family Business, 83 WASH. L. REV. 123, 127–28 (2008) (describing 
several advanced estate planning techniques and why they may be inadvisable for family 
businesses). 
 46. See William S. Huff, The Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust, 38 ARK. L. REV. 139, 
139–41 (1984). 
 47. See I.R.C. § 2042(2) (2012) (providing that life insurance proceeds are only included 
in the gross estate of a decedent if she has incidents of ownership over it). 
 48. See id. § 2503(b)(1) (setting the annual exclusion, to be adjusted to inflation by 
multiples of $1000).  The exclusion is currently $14,000. Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 
623. 
 49. Fondren v. Comm’r, 324 U.S. 18, 20 (1945). 
 50. This power has come to be known as a Crummey power after the taxpayer who 
brought the case that upheld the technique. Crummey v. Comm’r, 397 F.2d 82, 86 (9th Cir. 
1968). 
 51. I.R.C. § 2042(2). 
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Family-limited entities also are used commonly to move wealth from one 
generation to another while minimizing estate taxes.52  This technique relies 
on gift and estate tax valuation rules.  Although most families use 
partnerships, limited liability corporations and Subchapter S corporations 
can achieve the same result.53  The fair market value of an asset for estate 
and gift tax purposes is “the price at which the property would change 
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any 
compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of 
relevant facts.”54  The family limited partnership (FLP) works because of 
two factors:  (1)  parents often want to keep their business in the family and 
as such place restrictions on transfer, and (2)  an asset with restrictions on 
transfer is not worth as much as one without.55 
The FLP is usually formed by a parent who transfers most of her property 
to the partnership in exchange for limited partnership interests.  The general 
partner is often a corporation owned by the individual and her children.  
The FLP need not be an actual business; many FLPs only contain stocks 
and cash.  When the parent transfers these partnership interests, they have to 
be discounted to reflect a lack of marketability and control.56  For example, 
assume that the parent had property worth $10 million.  If she did nothing 
with this property, she would be liable for tax on the amount over her 
lifetime exemption, $4.75 million.  If instead she used an FLP to transfer 
the property, that $10 million could perhaps be discounted 35 percent 
because the interest has restrictions on transfer and it cannot easily be sold 
on the market.  The property value could then further be reduced by another 
discount of 15 percent because the general partner (the corporation owned 
by the family) controls all the decisions.  Thus, if the interest were to be 
sold, the buyer would have no control of the partnership.  After these 
discounts, the $10 million property would be valued at $5.525 million, and 
taxes would only be due on $275,000. 
Although these illogical discounts are based solely on arbitrary form 
changing, this technique has been used for over two decades.57  At first the 
IRS contended that the separate interests in the FLP should be aggregated 
for valuation purposes, but it eventually abandoned this position.58  The IRS 
 
 52. See, e.g., Drake, supra note 45, at 191. 
 53. Subchapter C corporations are avoided because they are taxed at the entity level. 
I.R.C. § 11. 
 54. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965). 
 55. See Drake, supra note 45, at 191, 199–200. 
 56. See Courtney Lieb, Comment, The IRS Wages War on the Family Limited 
Partnership:  How to Establish a Family Limited Partnership That Will Withstand Attack, 71 
UMKC L. REV. 887, 893 (2003). 
 57. See Kenneth P. Brier & Joseph B. Darby III, Family Limited Partnerships:  
Decanting Family Investment Assets into New Bottles, 49 TAX LAW. 127, 127 (1995) 
(“However, in recent years, a series of successful estate tax valuation cases, coupled with 
formal concessions by the Service on some key legal issues, have created an incentive for 
taxpayers to broaden the uses of FLPs.  In turn, these incentives have raised the question of 
how far taxpayers can go in utilizing the FLP for gift and estate planning purposes, 
particularly as a new bottle into which to decant other types of family investment assets.”). 
 58. Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202. 
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closely scrutinizes FLPs, but taxpayers generally have been successful in 
court.59 
II.  JUDICIAL BASE EROSION 
OF THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX 
Since the compromise reflected in the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 
2012 was reached at the start of 2013, no legislation modifying the federal 
estate tax has been enacted.  This suggests that the legislative and executive 
branches have reached an impasse that preserves the status quo.  This part 
shows that despite the lack of new laws, estate tax loopholes continue to 
grow because erosion of the estate tax base has been accelerated by judges.  
As I will discuss later in this Article, the narrative of the estate tax as a limit 
on the freedom of disposition has been entrenched further by court 
decisions. 
A.  From Graegin to Keller:  
Estate Tax Advantages in Illiquidity 
The estate tax advantages of loans incurred by an illiquid estate to 
finance estate tax obligations can be considerable.  A noticeable shift in the 
judicial permissiveness of this technique can be tracked by looking at three 
cases:  Estate of Graegin v. Commissioner,60 Estate of Black v. 
Commissioner,61 and Keller v. United States.62  The first case was decided 
before the estate tax battles of the 1990s and early 2000s.  The latter two 
cases were decided during the more recent period of increasing exemptions 
and arguably increased judicial deference to freedom of disposition. 
In Graegin, the decedent’s probate estate possessed only $20,000 of 
liquid assets from which to satisfy an estate tax liability of over $200,000.63  
A trust established by the decedent held the preferred stock in a closely held 
corporation, the common stock of which was largely owned by the 
decedent’s son (who also served as the corporation’s president).64  To avoid 
selling the preferred stock, the estate (of which the decedent’s son served as 
coexecutor) borrowed the $200,000 estate tax liability from the 
corporation.65  In one sense, the decedent’s son was on both sides of the 
transaction.  In a more formalistic sense, the parties (the estate and the 
corporation) structured the loan as an unsecured fifteen-year balloon 
 
 59. See, e.g., Kimbell v. United States, 371 F.3d 257, 268–69 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that there were significant nontax motives to form the FLP, including the desire to retain 
assets in a single well-managed entity). 
 60. 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 387 (1988). 
 61. 133 T.C. 340 (2009). 
 62. 697 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 63. Graegin, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) at 389. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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obligation, calling for interest at 15 percent per year.66  The note prohibited 
prepayment of interest and principal.67 
The estate claimed a deduction for the full, undiscounted value of the 
interest payment (approximately $450,000) due at the conclusion of the 
fifteen-year note term.68  The Tax Court sustained the deduction against the 
IRS’s challenge, finding the loan was incurred by the estate necessarily to 
avoid the forced sale of illiquid assets and finding the arrangement to 
constitute a genuine loan (despite admittedly being “disturbed” by the 
single payment of interest and principal).69  Note that what is now called 
the Graegin loan technique will produce considerable estate tax savings 
even when the estate tax and income tax rates are equivalent.  Because the 
estate was able to currently deduct a future payment of interest, the current 
estate tax savings will necessarily outweigh the future income tax cost (with 
such savings increasing with the term of the loan). 
The Service continued to challenge the Graegin loan technique, which 
subsequently was pursued in connection with FLP planning.  For instance, 
in Estate of Black, the decedent’s estate borrowed $71 million from an FLP 
in which the decedent held an interest.70  The Tax Court determined that, as 
a practical matter, the estate depended on a distribution from the partnership 
to satisfy its obligations under the loan: 
The loan structure, in effect, constituted an indirect use of . . . stock 
[owned by the partnership] to pay the debts of [the decedent’s] estate and 
accomplished nothing more than a direct use of that stock for the same 
purpose would have accomplished, except for the substantial estate tax 
savings.71 
Accordingly, the court upheld the IRS Commissioner’s denial of the 
deduction for interest paid under the loan.72 
However, not all courts are as exacting in their scrutiny of Graegin loans.  
For instance, in Keller, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
distinguished Estate of Black and approved an interest deduction under 
fairly extreme circumstances.73  Following the death of her husband, the 
decedent in Keller began exploring plans to establish an FLP to be funded 
with approximately $300 million of cash, certificates of deposit, and 
bonds.74  Two family trusts were to hold the limited partnership interests, 
and an LLC was to be formed to hold the general partnership interests.75  
The decedent executed the documents forming the limited partnership and 
LLC and then died a few days later.76  The expected capital contributions 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 390. 
 69. Id. at 390–91. 
 70. Estate of Black v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 340, 358 (2009). 
 71. Id. at 385. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Keller v. United States, 697 F.3d 238, 247–48 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 74. Id. at 240. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 240–41. 
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were described in contemporaneously produced notes and spreadsheets, but 
the decedent died before the assets were actually transferred to the 
partnership.77  Acting on the advice of its accountant, who believed that the 
formation and funding of the limited partnership had been ineffective, the 
estate paid over $147 million in estate taxes.78  But the accountant later 
reconsidered this position after attending a continuing legal education 
seminar.79 
Roughly a year after the decedent’s death, the estate completed the 
funding of the partnership.80  The estate then pursued a refund of a 
significant portion of the estate tax liability, with the refund based primarily 
on valuation discounts attributable to the partnership interests.81  In addition 
to funding the partnership, the estate retroactively restructured its earlier 
estate tax payment as a loan from the partnership to the estate, followed by 
the estate’s payment of taxes.82  The estate issued a backdated promissory 
note to memorialize the restructured transaction.83  Accordingly, the estate 
claimed a deduction for interest payments on the restructured loan, and this 
deduction served as an additional basis for the refund claim.84 
The Government argued that the circumstances in Keller were essentially 
the same as those in Estate of Black and that the Fifth Circuit therefore 
should deny the interest deduction.85  The Fifth Circuit disagreed, 
distinguishing Estate of Black on the basis that partnership assets were the 
only assets in that case that could have been used to make the loan 
payments.86  By contrast, the estate in Keller included additional 
nonpartnership assets, which (in theory at least) could have been liquidated 
to finance the loan payments.87  For this reason, the court rejected the 
Government’s argument that the tax payment should have been 
characterized as a partnership distribution.88  The court apparently was not 
persuaded by the fact that the assets used to make the tax payment were, in 
fact, the same assets that the court also held had been transferred to the 
partnership. 
Ironically, one of the bases for allowing the interest deduction was that 
the estate was largely illiquid, as the estate’s nonpartnership assets 
consisted of ranch and mineral holdings.89  Of course, the decedent died 
holding primarily liquid assets—i.e., the $300 million of cash, certificates 
of deposit, and bonds—and these assets were in fact liquidated to satisfy the 
estate tax liability.  Nonetheless, the court considered the estate to be 
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illiquid and thus entitled to the interest deduction because the liquid assets 
were beneficially owned by the partnership as of the decedent’s death.90 
B.  From Procter to Wandry:  
The Evolution of Conditions Subsequent 
The evolution in the conditions subsequent cases is even more troubling 
in its scope.  Successful use of this technique prevents the Service from 
making meaningful adjustments on audited returns. 
In Commissioner v. Procter,91 the taxpayer possessed remainder interests 
in two trusts that were to become possessory on his mother’s death.  He 
assigned these remainder interests to a separate trust, which obligated the 
trustees to use trust property to satisfy the balance due on loans to the 
taxpayer by the taxpayer’s mother.92  The taxpayer retained an income 
interest in any funds that remained after repayment of the loans, and the 
principal of the trust was to be distributed to the taxpayer’s children on his 
death.93 
In an attempt to insulate the transfer from gift tax consequences, the 
taxpayer inserted a savings clause into the transfer document.94  This 
provision instructed that, in the event of a final order or judgment 
determining that any portion of the transfer constituted a gift, that portion of 
the property would “automatically be deemed not to be included in the 
conveyance in trust hereunder and shall remain the sole property of [the 
taxpayer].”95  The Fourth Circuit refused to enforce this provision on policy 
grounds: 
This is clearly a condition subsequent and void because contrary to public 
policy.  A contrary holding would mean that upon a decision that the gift 
was subject to tax, the court making such decision must hold it not a gift 
and therefore not subject to tax. . . .  It is manifest that a condition which 
involves this sort of trifling with the judicial process cannot be 
sustained.96 
The court justified its holding on three grounds:  (1)  the provision had a 
tendency to discourage the collection of tax; (2)  the condition would 
obstruct the administration of justice by forcing courts to pass on a moot 
issue; and (3)  the condition itself was illogical—a final order of judgment 
of a tax liability could not be reversed by a subsequent transfer.97 
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Procter has come to stand for the proposition that conditions subsequent 
to the initial gratuitous transfer that are introduced for the purpose of 
avoiding the imposition of the gift tax violate public policy. 
More than fifty years later, with savings clauses or other conditions 
subsequent unenforceable under Procter and its progeny, taxpayers recently 
have turned their sights to so-called defined value transfer clauses as a way 
of avoiding the conditions subsequent label while achieving a similar result.  
The first case that tested this taxpayer strategy was McCord v. 
Commissioner.98  In McCord, a husband and wife made irrevocable 
transfers of all of their limited partnership interests in a family-owned 
partnership to four donees, two of which were tax-exempt entities.99  
Importantly, the assignment agreement did not specify the respective 
percentages of partnership interests that were to be transferred to each 
donee.100  Instead, the assignment agreement specified only the fair market 
value of partnership interests that each donee was to receive.101 
The assignment agreement instructed that the assigned partnership 
interests be allocated among the donees in the following cascading order:  
(1)  generation skipping transfer (GST) trusts were to receive partnership 
interests equal to the amount of the taxpayers’ remaining GST tax 
exemption; (2)  the taxpayers’ sons were to receive partnership interests 
worth approximately $7 million, reduced by the value of the interests 
conveyed to the GST trusts under the first allocation; (3)  a nonprofit 
symphony was to receive the lesser of $134,000 worth of partnership 
interests or the amount of any partnership interests that remained after the 
first two allocations; and (4)  a tax-exempt community foundation was to 
receive the value of any partnership interests not allocated under the prior 
provisions.102  The taxpayers retained no control over how the assigned 
partnership interests would be allocated among the donees.103  Rather, the 
donees made this determination several months after the assignment by 
having the assigned partnership interests appraised and allocating those 
interests with the defined-value instructions.104  Only at this point were the 
precise percentage partnership interests that were transferred to each donee 
established.105  A few months after the donees executed the confirmation 
agreement, the partnership redeemed the limited partnership interests held 
by the tax-exempt organizations.106 
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The taxpayers reported the value of their gifts based on the per-unit value 
reflected in the appraisal, which incorporated a variety of entity-related 
valuation discounts.107  The Service determined that the per-unit value of 
the assigned partnership interests was almost double the amount claimed by 
the taxpayers and therefore increased the value of the gifts to the GST trusts 
and to the taxpayers’ sons.108  The taxpayers, however, were not 
particularly concerned with the Service’s valuation objection.109  They 
argued that, pursuant to the formula clause in the assignment agreement, the 
Service’s increased valuation of the assigned partnership interests simply 
meant that more of the partnership interests should have been allocated to 
the tax-exempt community foundation as the residual value had done.110  
This adjustment would have produced no additional revenue; the increased 
gift to the community foundation would have been offset by an increased 
charitable deduction.111  The Service, in turn, responded that any transfer 
that systematically protected a revaluation of the transferred property from 
generating additional tax revenue was void on public policy grounds.112 
The Tax Court issued a divided opinion in the case.  The majority 
opinion approached the matter by starting with the percentage partnership 
interests that ultimately were received by each donee—in effect, treating the 
taxpayers’ assignment agreement and the donees’ confirmation agreement 
as components of a single transaction.113  The majority first determined the 
proper per-unit value of the assigned partnership interests through a 
painstaking analysis.114  Then, to determine the gift tax consequence, they 
applied the proper per-unit value to the percentage partnership interests that 
actually were received by the donees.115  The majority refused to treat the 
revaluation of the partnership interests as allocating additional interests to 
the tax-exempt foundation, noting that the community foundation was not 
entitled to an additional share of the transferred partnership interests under 
state law.116  Having undermined the taxpayers’ attempt to bulletproof the 
gift from valuation challenge in this manner, the majority did not need to 
address the public policy challenge.  However, other judges of the Tax 
Court would have utilized the public policy doctrine articulated in Procter 
and Ward to deny any increase in the charitable deduction for amounts the 
charitable organizations would never receive.117 
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Government dropped its public policy 
argument and, instead, advanced the theory endorsed by the Tax Court 
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majority.  In a fairly indignant opinion, the Fifth Circuit emphatically 
reversed in the taxpayers’ favor.118  As reflected below, the Fifth Circuit 
disapproved of the majority’s consideration of the manner in which the 
donees allocated the percentage partnership interests among themselves: 
It is clear beyond cavil that the Majority should have stopped with the 
Assignment Agreement’s plain wording.  By not doing so, however, and 
instead continuing on to the post-gift Confirmation Agreement’s intra-
donee concurrence on the equivalency of dollars to percentage of interests 
in [the partnership], the Majority violated the firmly-established maxim 
that a gift is valued as of the date that it is complete; the flip side of that 
maxim is that subsequent occurrences are off limits.119 
Without explaining how the property interests transferred to each donee 
could be determined without reference to the donees’ confirmation 
agreement, the Fifth Circuit viewed the transfer of value that occurred under 
the assignment agreement as completing the gift.120  Accordingly, any 
increase in the per-unit valuation of the partnership interests could not 
increase the taxpayers’ gift tax liability.121 
Defined-value transfers understandably have become quite popular in the 
estate-planning community since the Fifth Circuit’s reversal in McCord.  
Although the appellate court in McCord did not address challenges to 
defined-value transfers based on Procter-like public policy objections—
because the Government did not advance these arguments on appeal—the 
Tax Court’s subsequent decision in Estate of Petter v. Commissioner122 has 
mitigated any lingering public policy concerns. 
The taxpayer in Petter first transferred stock in United Parcel Service to 
an LLC and then made gratuitous assignments of LLC units.123  Each 
assignment concerned a specified number of LLC units, with a defined 
value being transferred to an irrevocable trust and the remaining value 
passing to community foundations.124  The transfer agreements provided 
that if the value of the units transferred to the trust, as finally determined for 
gift tax purposes, exceeded the amount of the defined value transfers, the 
trust would make corrective transfers of LLC units to the charitable 
beneficiary.125  The IRS challenged the per-unit value of the transferred 
LLC interests and further argued that any purported reallocation of units 
from the trust to the charitable beneficiary should be disregarded under 
Procter as a subsequent transfer.126  The Tax Court disagreed, finding that 
the taxpayer’s transfer was one of a formula amount instead of an absolute 
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number of LLC units.127  The court found this distinction meaningful, 
noting that “savings clauses are void, but formula clauses are fine.”128 
In addition to distinguishing the Procter decision, the Tax Court went on 
to dismiss other public policy arguments against the technique, noting that a 
redetermination of the value of the transferred parties would have economic 
consequences to the transferees and relying on the fiduciary obligations of 
the charitable organizations to enforce their rights under the gift 
agreements.129  In short, the Tax Court was not willing to treat the charities 
as serving a mere accommodation role in the taxpayer’s estate planning. 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Service dropped its Procter argument, 
arguing instead that the adjustment feature of the defined-value clauses 
subjected a portion of the gift to the charity (the corrective transfers) to a 
condition precedent—an IRS audit—in violation of Treasury Regulation 
section 25.2522(c)-3(b)(1).130  The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, 
distinguishing true conditional gifts—if, for example, a portion would pass 
to charity only in the event of an audit—from formula gifts, in which the 
number of units received by the charity is predetermined but not 
ascertainable until per-unit values finally are determined.131  According to 
the court, the corrective transfers to the charity were not dependent on an 
IRS audit; rather, the IRS audit simply resolved an open question as to how 
many units the charity was entitled to receive, that number being fixed 
(though unknown) as of the date of the original assignments.132  The Ninth 
Circuit pointed out that the IRS was not the only party that could have 
challenged the per-unit value.133  Either the trust or the charity could have 
challenged the valuation as well (and thereby potentially triggered 
corrective transfers), though the court acknowledged that neither party was 
likely to do so.134 
In Wandry v. Commissioner,135 the Tax Court approved a substantially 
more aggressive planning technique:  the use of a defined-value clause 
without a charitable component.136  In Wandry, a husband and wife formed 
an LLC with their four children.137  On January 1, 2004, when the gift tax 
exemption equivalent was $1,000,000 and the annual exclusion was 
$11,000, each of the taxpayers executed an assignment of “a sufficient 
number of my [LLC membership units] so that the fair market value of such 
Units for federal gift tax purposes shall be [$261,000 for each assignment to 
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a child and $11,000 for each assignment to a grandchild].”138  The 
assignment further provided: 
Although the number of Units gifted is fixed on the date of the gift, that 
number is based on the fair market value of the gifted Units, which cannot 
be known on the date of the gift but must be determined after such date 
based on all relevant information as of that date.139 
The assignment also stated: 
[I]f, after the number of gifted Units is determined based on [an 
appraisal], the IRS challenges such valuation and a final determination of 
a different value is made by the IRS or a court of law, the number of 
gifted Units shall be adjusted . . . so that the value of the number of Units 
gifted to each person equals the amount set forth above, in the same 
manner as a federal estate tax formula marital deduction amount would be 
adjusted for a valuation redetermination by the IRS and/or a court of 
law.140 
The Service argued that the case should be controlled by Procter on the 
theory that the assignment instrument allowed taxpayers to “take property 
back” on the happening of a condition subsequent—that is, an adjustment in 
value of the gift tax units for gift tax purposes.141  Relying in significant 
part on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Petter, the court interpreted the 
assignments as transferring a predetermined number of LLC units, even 
though the exact number of units would not be known until the date on 
which the per-unit gift tax value finally was determined.142  In the view of 
the Tax Court, both before and after the IRS audit, the children and 
grandchildren were entitled to receive the same number of units, and thus 
the assignments would not be viewed as creating an impermissible 
condition subsequent of the type found invalid in Procter.143 
The Tax Court refused to distinguish Petter on the basis that it involved 
charitable beneficiaries or that, in Petter, the adjustment clause affected 
only the relative shares of the donees and not the amounts transmitted by 
the taxpayer:  “It is inconsequential that the adjustment clause reallocates 
membership units among [taxpayers] and the donees rather than a charitable 
organization because the reallocations do not alter the transfers.”144  The 
Tax Court was also apparently unconcerned that the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Petter was based in substantial part on Treasury Regulation 
section 25.2522(c)-3(b)(1), which was obviously of no direct relevance in 
the Wandry case.145  Although the congressional policy of encouraging 
charitable gifts may have influenced the result in Petter, the Tax Court 
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concluded that this factor was not outcome determinative.146  Furthermore, 
the court determined that the absence of a charitable donee in the Wandry 
transaction did not raise additional public policy concerns.147  Although the 
Government’s appeal of the Wandry decision was subsequently dismissed 
by stipulation, the Service issued a nonacquiescence to the decision.148 
The Wandry decision is important because it starkly reveals a historical 
shift in the way courts analyze estate planning techniques.  Although the 
conditions subsequent and the illiquidity cases have been discussed 
separately, there is a historical thread tying them together.  The Procter 
Court’s broad and substantive public policy holding can be seen as 
grounded in a historical understanding that administering a tax system 
sometimes requires looking beyond the form of a transaction.149  A 
taxpayer can structure her affairs in a way that meets the letter of the law, 
but tax benefits can still be denied by a court after viewing the transaction 
as a whole. 
The McCord, Petter, and Wandry Courts represent a rejection of this 
principle in favor of estate tax formalism.  With increased focus on the 
details of the taxpayer transaction, the overall thrust of the tax avoidance 
has been subsumed.  The next part of this Article argues that this formalism 
has been spurred by, and in turn has entrenched, a narrative of the estate tax 
as a limit on liberty and the freedom of disposition. 
III.  PROPOSALS TO “FIX” THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX 
AND THE LESSONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 
For those worried about the current state of our wealth transfer system, 
all is not lost.  The estate tax still brings in revenue that our fiscally 
imbalanced nation needs.  As proponents have noted, the revenues 
generated from the estate tax between 2016 through 2025 would be enough 
to fund the Food and Drug Administration, the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, and the Environmental Protection Agency.150 
The proliferation of loopholes is not intractable, as there have been 
several proposals to increase the revenue potential and efficacy of the 
federal estate tax.  This part briefly covers the details of some representative 
proposals.  It acknowledges their potential efficacy but argues that their 
reliance on facts ignores the importance of stories in human decision 
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making.  I then introduce System Justification Theory to show how these 
estate tax stories became entrenched narratives. 
A.  Proposals:  Executive, Legislative, and Academic 
The Obama Administration’s budget proposals for fiscal years 2014 
through 2016 would put pre-2009 estate tax exemptions and tax rates back 
into place, but would retain the present portability rules for spouses.151  The 
exemption amount would be $3.5 million for estate and generation-skipping 
transfer tax purposes and $1 million for gift tax purposes, with neither 
amount indexed for inflation.152  The top estate and gift tax rate would be 
45 percent.153 
On the legislative front, Representative Jim McDermott introduced a 
more ambitious proposal to amend the estate tax in 2014.  The Sensible 
Estate Tax Act of 2014 would modify the wealth transfer tax rules by 
reducing the exemption amount and increasing the applicable tax rates.154  
The bill would reduce the exemption amount for estate, gift, and 
generation-skipping transfer tax purposes to $1 million, indexed for post-
2000 inflation.155  The bill also would increase the top marginal tax rate to 
55 percent and provide for inflation indexing of the rate bracket cut-off 
points.156 
Academics also have widely addressed estate and gift tax reform, and 
there have been numerous proposals to improve the estate tax.  
Representative examples include proposals from Paul Caron and James 
Repetti and from Edward McCaffery. 
Paul Caron and James Repetti have advanced a number of estate and gift 
tax reform proposals, which they argue would generate needed revenue, 
reduce inequality, and contribute to economic growth.  One proposed 
solution is returning to the $3.5 million exemption and increasing the 
maximum rate to 45 percent—similar to the Obama proposal—but also 
limiting the GST tax exemption to transfers occurring within fifty years.157  
Additionally, they recommend eliminating minority discounts in certain 
circumstances.158  Next, they suggest maintaining parity between the estate 
and gift tax unified credit.159  They also advance restricting the ability of 
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gifts made in trust to qualify for the gift tax annual exclusion and, finally, 
restricting Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts through a lifetime cap.160 
According to Edward McCaffery, it is unlikely that the estate tax will 
become more meaningful in the foreseeable future, but it is also unlikely 
that it will be repealed.161  McCaffery argues that the battle over the estate 
tax has distracted us from the advantages that stepped-up basis162 
provides.163  Instead of focusing on increasing the rates or lowering the 
exemption, McCaffery would change the section 1014 basis rules that allow 
for stepped-up basis.164  McCaffery suggests that such a move would 
eliminate certain kinds of tax planning and lessen wealth concentrations 
more effectively.165 
B.  Stories Trump Science 
While the above proposals are reasonable alternatives to the status quo, 
they do little to confront the unpopularity of the estate tax.  “Stories Trump 
Science,” the twentieth chapter of the Graetz and Shapiro account of the 
estate tax battles, states: 
Like Kerry, Dukakis, and Dewey before them, the opponents of estate tax 
repeal failed to grasp that in politics, science is never enough.  By 
expecting science to sway political opinion, the repeal opponents let the 
ball get away from them.  While the Democrats snoozed, their opponents 
transformed one major tax policy—the levy on inheritances—from a 
radical fringe reform to an apparently populist demand to repeal an 
“immoral” tax.166 
Graetz and Shapiro go to substantial lengths in their book to show that the 
success of the death tax repeal movement was not just the result of money 
and behind-the-scenes lobbying.  Rather, estate tax abolitionists understood 
that tax policy is more about ideology than facts.  The repeal movement let 
the wealthy stay in the background and relied on the stories of farmers and 
small business owners to convince Americans that the estate tax was 
unfair.167 
This argument about narrative explicitly relies on psychological insights 
and, more specifically, on the work of Jerome Bruner, a cognitive 
psychologist.168  In his influential book, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds,169 
Bruner argued that cognitive science to that point had been too narrowly 
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focused on the logical, more scientific aspects of the mind—the 
“paradigmatic mode.”170  Bruner underscored the importance of what he 
termed the “narrative mode.”171  This part of the mind uses creativity to 
make experiences meaningful.172  It appreciates good stories, gripping 
drama, primitive myths and rituals, and plausible historical accounts, and it 
is not tethered to the facts or science of these accounts.173 
As such, the lack of “rightness” in death tax accounts is only of partial 
importance.  A part of the mind will ultimately be attracted to the meaning 
and comfort that stories provide.  The story of the farmer forced to sell 
property to pay taxes is thus more important than noting that only a handful 
of small farms are affected by the estate tax.  Bruner’s work suggests that 
progressives should focus their energies on countering the estate tax 
abolitionist narrative.  As Graetz and Shapiro noted, something like “The 
Paris Hilton Tax Cut” might be a good start.174 
Unfortunately, countering stories with other stories might not be enough.  
More recent research suggests that countering the death tax narrative might 
be even more complicated as stories become entrenched and tend to be 
defended vigorously as part of the status quo. 
C.  System Justification Theory 
and the “Death Tax” Repeal Movement 
System Justification Theory (SJT) connects the use of narrative to the 
persistence of the status quo and hierarchy in American society.  The 
theory, first proposed by John Jost and Mahzain Banaji in 1994,175 posits 
that there is an underlying human need to support and defend the social 
status quo, even among those who are seemingly most disadvantaged by 
it.176  SJT explains the contours of this motive and the contexts in which it 
operates.177  Similar to the group justification theories, SJT predicts that the 
powerful are motivated to preserve their dominant position in society.178  
Yet, the support of such policies is not based on group-level ethnocentrism 
alone. 
Instead, SJT suggests that people can, at least under certain 
circumstances, be motivated to justify and defend the existing status quo.179  
Such motivation can manifest itself in many different ways.  However, in 
the realm of group relations, one way that system justification can emerge is 
in terms of justifying and defending the existing dominance of the wealthy 
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in society, irrespective of the perceiver’s own group membership.180  This 
leads to a counterintuitive prediction, in the sense that even the nonwealthy 
would be expected to justify the status quo.181 
Support for the system is often manifested in different ways.  For 
example, stereotypes and stock narratives can help justify systems by 
suggesting reasons that capable, smart, and hardworking individuals are at 
the top and that dumb, slothful, and irresponsible individuals are at the 
bottom.  In this way, our current, limited system of wealth taxation reflects 
the notion that, contrary to our apparent commitment to equal opportunity, 
we value and encourage wealth accumulation. 
As Jost and his colleagues are careful to note, membership in a high 
versus low status group is not the only determinant of system-justifying 
motives.182  In particular, the ideological beliefs of the perceiver also can 
play an important role.183  These beliefs are nourished by stories: 
Analogies that maintain the basic structure of relationships among the 
elements are most easily retrieved and applied.  Thus, we find it easier to 
analogize from one hierarchical system to another, given that there are 
corresponding roles for leaders and followers.  Metaphors that map from 
one system level to another are quite common:  a family (of nations), (it 
takes) a village, a (salvation) army, a war on (poverty, drugs, terror).  
These frames are powerful both because they bring many implicit 
associations and because they activate thoughts about systems that are 
themselves the subject of system-justifying motives.184 
Individuals do not have to go very far to find ways to justify the status quo 
because stereotypes, stories, and ideologies supply easy explanations and 
excuses for the system. 
System justification does leave room for changing the status quo.  It 
acknowledges that individuals are parts of multiple, overlapping systems 
whose importance varies by time and context.185  The instances in which 
the status quo is resisted are the exceptions, unfortunately.  More often than 
not individuals have a conservative tendency to accept the legitimacy of the 
established hierarchy and to perceive existing institutions as basically 
reasonable and just until proven otherwise.186 
System justification theorists have explicitly connected their insights to 
Graetz and Shapiro’s institutional account.187  The success of estate tax 
abolitionists was partly a triumph of framing.  According to Gary Blasi and 
John Jost, estate taxes involve two common systems:  (1)  the family and 
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(2)  the nation.188  Repeal advocates successfully framed the issue as one of 
family rather than country.  As such, the estate tax was an affront to a 
family’s future instead of a guarantor of equal opportunity.  Blasi and Jost 
suggest that advancing another version of the family frame might have 
helped progressives counter repeal efforts.189 
With this understanding, the previously discussed jurisprudence, and 
more specifically the historical shift between Procter and Wandry, comes 
into focus.  The courts not only shifted from a substantive to a formalistic 
analysis, but from a “nation” frame to a “family” frame.  If seen as an issue 
of family, then all but the most egregious taxpayer attempts to avoid the tax 
can be blessed as legitimate. 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussion underscores some of the challenges for those 
who favor reducing wealth inequality, at least partially, through the tax 
system.  It is not only a matter of economics and facts.  It is also, and 
possibly more importantly, a battle of narrative.  Ceding the rhetorical 
ground is unlikely to bring success because it ignores the ways human 
minds work.  The following is not meant to be an exhaustive discussion of 
the options going forward or their permutations, but rather some 
suggestions for progressives. 
The most obvious area of focus is reframing the death tax narrative.  This 
could include advertisements with Paris Hilton as suggested by Graetz and 
Shapiro.  Unfortunately, progressives have displayed an unwillingness to 
engage in such framing.  Perhaps it is seen as too manipulative, but it is 
difficult to fathom a more far-reaching tax without reframing.  Even if the 
attempt is made, it is not clear that nuanced progressive arguments can be 
captured in a simple-system frame.  This would involve a sustained effort.  
Cognitive psychologist George Lakoff has suggested the frame of a national 
membership organization where taxes are the dues.190 
Another approach may be to ignore the estate tax, as suggested by 
McCaffery.  The small size of the tax is one reason, the entrenched family 
framed narrative is another.  Given the sustained work that would be 
required to reframe the tax, it may not be worth the effort.  While 
McCaffery focused on the stepped-up basis rules, it may be that 
progressives should move away from the tax system more generally.  For 
example, campaign finance has been an area in which wealth inequality 
arguments have been used much more forcefully and effectively.191  The 
frame of a game played with unequal rules and resources has been 
successfully utilized by politicians across the spectrum.  Efforts could be 
focused on the institutional hurdles in that arena. 
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Perhaps surprisingly, I am at least somewhat sympathetic to an approach 
that may eventually result in a repeal of the federal estate tax.  While I am 
committed to a system that lessens wealth inequality, I am increasingly 
agnostic about the form taxation takes.  Although I would not suggest 
repealing the estate tax without getting anything in return, I have no 
objection to the estate tax serving as a bargaining chip in broader budget 
negotiations.  The estate tax might be the most progressive part of the tax 
system but the collection of revenue is not a primary concern if we use 
spending to maintain the progressivity of the system.  An attachment to the 
federal estate tax is indeed a distraction if it works to prevent other ways of 
reducing wealth disparities. 
Ultimately, any successful strategy needs to reclaim the historical battles 
and lessons that two centuries of taxation have taught us.  While the estate 
tax may not be ideal, it is the result of compromises which were difficult to 
achieve.  If it is repealed, it is doubtful that another levy will take its place 
in combating wealth concentrations. 
